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ARTICLES
REGULATING FINANCIAL INNOVATION: A
MORE PRINCIPLES-BASED PROPOSAL?
Dan Awrey
INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis has exposed the complexity of modern
financial markets. One of the primary drivers of this complexity has been
financial innovation. From sub-prime mortgages, securitization, and credit
default swaps to sophisticated quantitative models for measuring and
managing risk, the footprints of financial innovation can be found at almost
every step along the road to the Great Recession. More broadly, complexity
and innovation—its nature and its pace—have combined to generate
significant asymmetries of information and expertise between public
regulators and private (regulated) actors and exacerbated the agency cost
problems that pervade global financial markets. At the same time, the pace
of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation chronically behind
the curve. Identifying the optimal policy response to the complexity and
nature and pace of innovation within financial markets is, accordingly,
vitally important in terms of the delivery of effective financial regulation.
Astonishingly, however, none of the proposals for regulatory reform which
have emerged in response to the crisis—including the recently enacted Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1—directly address the
challenges posed by these seemingly ubiquitous forces.
With a view to redressing this somewhat glaring oversight, this paper
examines the desirability of “more principles-based” financial regulation (or
MPBR) as a potential response to the challenges stemming from the
complexity and innovativeness of modern financial markets. The focal
point of this examination is thus the philosophy or style of financial
regulation: it is concerned with who generates substantive regulation (and
outcomes) within regulatory regimes and how, as opposed to the
institutional structure, statutory construction, or substantive content of
regulation, in and of themselves. MPBR is itself a recent innovation—
cutting against the historically predominant trend toward prescriptive, rulesbased approaches to financial regulation. MPBR experienced a surge in
momentum in the decade or so prior to the crisis, with comprehensive
principles-based regimes pursued by the United Kingdom (U.K.) Financial
Services Authority (FSA), the Australian Securities and Investment
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Commission (ASIC) and other jurisdictions, most notably Canada, showing
signs of moving in a similar direction. In the wake of the crisis, however,
MPBR has been the target of significant—and, as I will argue, largely
misguided—criticism.
Sailing against this prevailing current, this paper advances the scholarly
and public policy debates surrounding the optimal approach toward
financial regulation in three ways. First, it describes the core principle
underlying MPBR and demonstrates how this principle transcends the now
stale “rules versus principles” debate. Second, using over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives markets as a case study, it illustrates the pervasiveness
and significance of asymmetries of information and expertise and agency
(incentive) problems within complex, innovative financial markets and how
MPBR manifests the potential to address many of the attendant regulatory
challenges. Finally, and more broadly, this paper seeks to move the debate
beyond the structure, perimeter, and even substance of regulation, and
toward the examination of questions respecting the optimal philosophy of
regulation given the complexity and innovation within modern financial
markets.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I canvasses the
traditional rules versus principles dialectic and examines its shortcomings
as a determinant of public policy. Part II introduces MPBR—its core
principle, the preconditions to its successful implementation and, if
implemented, its wisdom and potential challenges—and illustrates how this
emerging philosophy of regulation transcends the formalism of the
traditional (arrested) dialectic. Employing the regulation of OTC derivatives
markets as a case study in complexity and innovation, Part III illustrates
how carving out a role for MPBR can ameliorate asymmetries of
information and expertise vis-à-vis regulators and regulated actors,
constrain agency costs, promote substantive harmonization, and generate
more responsive and durable regulation. At the same time, it examines the
challenges to the successful implementation of MPBR, especially in terms
of fostering trust between regulators and regulated actors and minimizing
the prospect of regulatory capture. Part IV concludes with some preliminary
observations respecting the broader potential applications of MPBR.
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES DIALECTIC
A. THE TRADITIONAL DIALECTIC
The debate respecting the optimality of rules versus principles (or
standards2) as mechanisms for delivering the content of legal norms
2. The terms “principles” and “standards” are often used interchangeably in the theoretical
literature. Some scholars, however, have employed the term “standard” in a manner encompassing
both rules and principles. See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles-

2011]

Regulating Financial Innovation

275

represents one of the most enduring dialectics in all of legal thought. This
dialectic incorporates both descriptive and normative elements. As a
descriptive matter, both rules and principles are often viewed as being
comprised of two basic components: triggers and responses.3 Where rules
and principles diverge, according to this view, is in their respective
approaches toward the design of each of these components. The archetypal
rule prescribes both the empirical substance of the trigger and the precise
response thereby elicited, leaving only factual issues to be determined by
the decision-maker (whether it be a prosecutor, judge, or regulatory
authority).4 The archetypal principle, in contrast, leaves both the trigger and
response to be determined by the decision-maker on the basis of an
underlying evaluative framework.5
Beyond such highly stylized conceptions, legal scholars have attempted
to differentiate between rules and principles on the basis of, inter alia, their
locus on a continuum from generality to specificity,6 their temporal
orientation,7 the degree of discretion which they confer upon regulated
actors,8 and the position they occupy within the hierarchy of norms.9
Ultimately, however, the largely binary nature of these attempts fails to
reflect that, in reality, it is perhaps more accurate—and in any event more
useful—to view rules and principles as “endpoints of a spectrum”10
integrating each of these variables (and potentially many others).
Simultaneously, it seems important to acknowledge that more complex
norms may contain both rules and principles11 and, as a corollary, the

and-Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91 (2003). As Lawrence Cunningham observes,
the term “standards” is also increasingly used to denote measures of performance or conduct, in
particular those promulgated by non-governmental organizations. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A
Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities
Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (2007). To avoid confusion, this paper
uses the term “principle” wherever possible. “Norm,” meanwhile, will be used as a generic term
encompassing both rules and principles.
3. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381 (1986). See also Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–88
(1976).
4. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 565–67 (1992); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803–04 (2005); Schlag, supra note 3, at 381–83.
5. See Schlag, supra note 3, at 381–83. This underlying evaluative framework may itself be
specified ex ante to varying degrees or left entirely to the ex post discretion of the decision-maker.
The degree to which this framework is transparent to those other than the decision-maker may also
vary widely in practice.
6. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1420.
7. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 567; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 953, 961 (1995).
8. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1422; Nelson, supra note 2, at 91.
9. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 966.
10. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV. 23, 26 (2000).
11. See id. at 27.
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tendency of rules and principles to blur into one another over time.12
Viewed from this perspective, it seems almost inevitable that the vast
majority of regulatory regimes will in practice contain a mixture of both
rules and principles.13 Indeed, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part
II, this is one of the rationales underlying the FSA’s branding of its
regulatory approach as simply more principles-based.14
The generic normative arguments for and against both rules and
principles will be instinctively familiar to every student of the law.15 Indeed,
the conceptual pattern of these arguments map on to some of the most
venerable debates—common law versus equity, codification versus judicial
discretion—in annals of legal discourse. So engrained are these arguments
in legal thinking that they endure despite the absence of any unanimity
within the traditional dialectic regarding the appropriate basis for evaluating
the relative merits and drawbacks of each mechanism.16 The benefits of
rules derive from their precision.17 By drawing a sharp line between
prohibited and permissible conduct, precision promotes greater
predictability: lowering the transaction costs of decision-making for those
subject to rules, thus encouraging planning and, ultimately, a more efficient
allocation of resources.18 At the same time, by constraining the discretion of
those who must apply them, the relative precision of rules also promotes

12. Schauer, supra note 4, at 805–06; Schlag, supra note 3, at 428–29.
13. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2008) [hereinafter Ford, New Governance].
14. Id. at 9.
15. Indeed, these arguments have become so generic as to induce Pierre Schlag to characterize
them as “drearily predictable, almost routine.” Schlag, supra note 3, at 380.
16. As Ford observes: “scholars have evaluated rules and principles in economic terms,
abstract normative ones, in terms of regulatory design and behavioral analysis, and on the basis of
particular values such as freedom/autonomy, democracy, community, or perceived legitimacy.”
Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 8 (citations omitted). For an economic analysis, see
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1974); Kaplow, supra note 4; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs
of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). For an abstract normative analysis,
see Kennedy, supra note 3. For a behavioral analysis, see Korobkin, supra note 10; Nelson, supra
note 2; Schauer, supra note 4. From the perspective of regulatory design, see IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992);
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). From the
perspective of freedom/autonomy, see Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 115–16 (1997). From the perspective of democratic values, see
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). Finally, from
the perspective of community, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 577 (1988).
17. Schlag, supra note 3, at 384. Indicia of precision, as the term is employed here, include,
but are not limited to, the specificity of both a norm’s trigger and its response, its transparency
(the use of language with well defined and universally accepted meanings within the relevant
community) and its accessibility (the easy application of the rule to concrete situations). Diver,
supra note 16, at 67–68.
18. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 969, 972.
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greater formal equality19 and minimizes the potential for bias, arbitrariness,
abuses of power, and rent seeking behavior on the part of decisionmakers.20
Rules, however, are not without their drawbacks. The drafters of rules
are invariably afflicted by cognitive and temporal constraints (i.e. bounded
rationality21) which undermine their ability both to draft rules which
encompass all future contingencies and to foresee the unintended
consequences of their drafting choices.22 The utilization of rules thus
manifests the risk that they will be rendered anachronistic by subsequent
developments.23 Furthermore, rules are by their very nature either overinclusive (capturing behaviors which should be excluded) or underinclusive (failing to capture behaviors which should be included).24 To the
extent of this over- and/or under-inclusiveness, rules generate incentives
which are incongruent with their underlying purposes.25 More specifically,
this emphasis of form over substance incentivizes those subject to rules to
engage in: (1) activities up to the boundary of permissible conduct;26 and
(2) welfare-reducing creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. As
explained by Lawrence Cunningham: “rules can be blueprints for evading
their underlying purposes. Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions
facilitate strategic evasion, allowing artful dodging of a rule’s spirit by
literal compliance with its technical letter.”27 Finally, as Cass Sunstein has
suggested, rather than minimizing the potential for bias, abuses of power,
and rent seeking behavior, rules may simply serve to drive such phenomena
underground.28
The traditional dialectic views the benefits and drawbacks of principles
as in many respects the mirror images of those typically associated with
rules. In stark contrast with the precise bright-line tests residing at the heart
19. Id. at 974–75.
20. Rose, supra note 16, at 591; Schlag, supra note 3, at 386; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 974–
75.

21. “Bounded rationality . . . is a semistrong form of rationality in which economic actors are
assumed to be ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.’” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45 (1985) (citing HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1961)). The concept of bounded rationality is grounded
in the notion that, if the mind is a scarce resource, there will exist temporal and cognitive
constraints on our ability to process information. Id. at 45–46.
22. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 957, 993.
23. Id. at 993–94. As discussed in greater detail infra, this assertion rests in large measure on
assumptions respecting the high transaction costs of amending an anachronistic rule.
24. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1689. Thus, for example, the archetypal rule with a predetermined response will not distinguish between flagrant and technical violations. Schlag, supra
note 3, at 386.
25. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 268; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 36; Sunstein, supra
note 7, at 992–93, 995. See also Diver, supra note 16, at 73.
26. Schlag, supra note 3, at 384–85.
27. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1423.
28. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 994–95.
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of rules, the primary benefits of principles derive from their flexibility and
resulting durability in the face of changing factual circumstances and
evolving customs and understandings.29 This contextual sensitivity is often
viewed as enabling principles to retain a greater degree of congruence with
their underlying purposes as compared with relatively static prescriptive
rules.30 The dual traits of flexibility and durability also render principles
more difficult to manipulate than rules—thereby frustrating opportunities
for both creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. Finally, as will be
explored in greater detail in Part II, the use of principles can provide the
foundation and impetus for dialogue. As explained by Pierre Schlag:
“[b]ecause standards are cast in evaluative terms, they place the onus on the
parties to work out and communicate their intentions completely and
thoroughly.”31 By promoting communication between drafters, decisionmakers, and those subject to their application, principles thus manifest the
potential to generate greater contextualized understandings (thereby
enhancing precision, certainty, and predictability) and, simultaneously,
ameliorate the potential adverse effects of bounded rationality and various
forms of bias, abuses of power, and rent seeking behavior.
The drawbacks of principles derive, first and foremost, from a
perceived absence of precision. Remaining faithful to the traditional
dialectic (at least for the moment), the absence of precision undermines the
certainty and predictability of norms formulated on the basis of principles.32
Principles are thus frequently criticized as rendering entitlements uncertain,
thereby increasing transaction costs, discouraging careful planning and,
ultimately, resulting in the sub-optimal allocation of resources.33 It has also
been advanced that, to the extent that principles eschew clearly defined
boundaries between prohibited and permissible conduct, they serve to chill
risk-averse actors from engaging in otherwise acceptable behaviors.34 The
absence of precise bright-line triggers and prescribed responses is also the
source of concerns that the use of principles may lead to erratic results by
decision-makers,
further
compounding
their
uncertainty
and
35
unpredictability. Building on this theme, critics often point to the
opportunities that principles generate for abuses of discretion on the part of
decision-makers which, in addition to generating deadweight losses, may

29. Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS
L.J. 425, 426 (2008) [hereinafter Black, Forms and Paradoxes]; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 616–17;
Schauer, supra note 4, at 804.
30. See Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation, 1 LAW & FIN.
MARKETS REV. 191, 193 (2007).
31. Schlag, supra note 3, at 388.
32. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 958.
33. Id.; Rose, supra note 16, at 609.
34. Schlag, supra note 3, at 385.
35. Id.
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render their application increasingly incongruent with their underlying
purposes.36
What becomes evident from the recitation of these largely boilerplate
arguments is that the traditional dialectic offers no clear predictions
respecting the optimality of rules versus principles and, thus, few (if any)
useful policy prescriptions. Indeed, the most we can extract from the
dialectic is that the relative desirability of rules and principles will depend
on both the design of a particular norm and the circumstance in which it is
applied.37 It is a question of horses for courses. This state of affairs has
prompted Pierre Schlag to observe that “[t]his dialectic doesn’t go
anywhere. It is an arrested dialectic: There is no moment of synthesis.”38
B. THE DIALECTIC REDUX: A QUESTION OF COSTS
The traditional dialectic has more recently been recast in terms of the
transaction and social costs stemming from: (1) the generation of legal
norms; (2) their subsequent application by decision-makers; and (3) the
resulting incentive effects on those subject to their application. This of
course makes perfect sense. In the absence of transaction costs, drafters
would be able to design infinitely precise norms contemplating the entire
universe of possible contingencies and ensuring absolute congruence with
their underlying purposes. Simultaneously, those subject to norms would
possess a complete understanding of how they apply to their precise
circumstances (thereby encouraging future planning and the efficient
allocation of resources) and be wholly dis-incentivized from engaging in
creative compliance or regulatory arbitrage (thereby eliminating potential
social costs). Yet we live in a world of transaction (and thus social) costs in
which drafters, decision-makers, and subjects face potentially significant
financial, technological, cognitive and temporal constraints. It seems
reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the relative costs of rules versus
principles play an important role in determining their optimality.
Conventional wisdom holds that the generation of rules will typically
involve the incursion of greater ex ante transaction costs attributable to the
time and effort expended by drafters to articulate the empirical substance of
triggers and match each trigger with the appropriate response.39 Thereafter,
the expectation is that these upfront costs will translate into lower ex ante
transaction costs for both decision-makers (applying rules) and subjects
(evaluating the potential application of rules to their current and
36. Id.; Diver, supra note 16, at 90–92; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 958. Diver characterizes the
potential for such abuses as the hidden transaction costs of controlling subordinate decisionmakers. Diver, supra note 16, at 90.
37. Diver, supra note 16, at 75–76.
38. Schlag, supra note 3, at 383.
39. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 267; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 562; Korobkin, supra
note 10, at 31–32.
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contemplated future conduct). The same conventional wisdom holds that
principles, meanwhile, to the extent that they defer judgments as to the
substance of triggers and the appropriate response to the point of
application, impose greater ex ante transaction costs on both decisionmakers and subjects.40 Utilizing this ex ante/ex ante framework, scholars
have emphasized the importance of both the frequency and
homo/heterogeneity of triggering fact patterns as potential determinants of
the optimality of rules versus principles.41 Scholars have also highlighted
the potential private and social costs flowing from the over/underinclusiveness of rules42 and, conversely, the perceived lack of certainty and
predictability surrounding principles.43
Ultimately, however, the conventional wisdom respecting the
transaction and social costs of both rules and principles is almost as
unsatisfactory as the traditional dialectic in which it is so deeply rooted. The
preponderance of this wisdom remains empirically untested and,
accordingly, must be approached with caution as a potential driver of public
policy. More importantly for the present purposes, the two-dimensional
transaction cost analyses which flow from this dialectic fail to adequately
account for the long-term, iterative nature of the relationships between
drafters, decision-makers, and subjects within many regulatory regimes.
Indeed, as will be explored in Part II, the agency and transaction cost
ramifications of more principles-based financial regulation provide perhaps
the most intuitive illustration of how this emerging regulatory philosophy
transcends the traditional (arrested) dialectic.

40. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 32–35. Although, as Korobkin explains, this is an oversimplification:
Predicting what behaviors are within the law’s boundaries might be more costly
under a standard than under a rule, but this is likely to depend on the content of the
standard. Standards that require adjudicators to judge citizens’ actions on the basis of a
cost-benefit analysis demand considerable effort on the part of citizens who wish to
conform to the law in order to avoid sanctions. However, standards that require
adjudicators to judge citizens’ actions on the basis of whether those actions comply
with community norms might require even less effort for citizens to understand than
would rules.
Id. at 35.
41. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 577; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 37. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 7, at 972–74. According to this view, rules are more likely to represent the optimal response
to frequently recurring and homogeneous fact patterns (essentially owing to economies of scale),
whereas principles are more likely to represent the optimal response to less frequent and more
diverse fact patterns (where over/under-inclusiveness are intuitively more likely to raise
problems). Sunstein, supra note 7, at 972–74.
42. See generally Diver, supra note 16.
43. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 31–35.
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C. THE DIALECTIC DISTILLED: A QUESTION OF
VALUE TRADEOFFS
Before shifting the examination to more principles-based financial
regulation, however, it is worth briefly considering the following question:
if the traditional dialectic is truly arrested, why has it proven so enduring?
One potentially compelling explanation is that the dialectic is simply a
reflection of far more fundamental normative disputes between competing
values: certainty versus flexibility, uniformity versus individualization,
stability and security versus dynamism.44 Along the same vein, rules and
principles can be seen as representing conflicting visions of the world.45
According to this view, whereas rules are designed to ring fence undesirable
conduct in a world of self-interested individuals, principles are designed to
promote “good” and “altruism”46 in a world inclined toward collectivism.
Approached from this perspective, the traditional dialectic can be distilled
down to a series of value tradeoffs.47 Stated bluntly, the optimality of rules
versus principles becomes a question of perspectives and priorities. While
conceptualizing the dialectic in such terms does not serve to liberate it
(indeed, quite the opposite), rendering transparent these competing visions,
values, and priorities is arguably a necessary pre-condition to meaningful
debate respecting the optimal design of public policy.
II. THE DIALECTIC TRANSCENDED: MORE PRINCIPLESBASED FINANCIAL REGULATION
Without a doubt, the emergence of more principles-based financial
regulation (or MPBR) represents one of the most important regulatory
developments within global financial markets in these, the early (and
heady) years of the 21st century. Yet in the wake of the global financial
crisis, this emerging philosophy of regulation has become a lightning rod
for criticism. Much of this criticism stems from the association of MPBR
with the FSA (long a “thought leader”48 in the field), its so-called “light
touch" approach to regulation, and its perceived culpability for failing either
44. For a more thorough list of these competing values or, as Schlag characterizes them,
“virtues” and “vices,” see Schlag, supra note 3, at 400.
45. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1766–76.
46. Id. at 1742, 1773–74; Rose, supra note 16, at 592. See also Schlag, supra note 3, at 418–
22.
47. Schlag, supra note 3, at 400–01.
48. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf
[hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT]; see also Black et al., supra note 30;
EXPERT PANEL ON SEC. REGULATION, CREATING AN ADVANTAGE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2009), available at
http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/Expert_Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.p
df [hereinafter EXPERT PANEL REPORT]. See generally Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities
Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257 (2010) [hereinafter
Ford, Global Financial Crisis]; Ford, New Governance, supra note 13.
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to predict the gathering storm or fix the leaking roof whilst the sun still
shined. It has not helped that MPBR has also been widely misunderstood.49
Consequently, this section begins by asking, what is more principles-based
financial regulation?
MPBR is frequently described as encompassing a move away from
detailed, prescriptive rules toward more high-level principles in establishing
the parameters within which regulated actors are required to conduct their
business activities.50 The “more” in MPBR, in part, reflects this shift: the
baseline comparator being historically predominant rules-based approaches
toward financial regulation. Viewed from this perspective, however, the
distinction between MPBR and purely prescriptive, rules-based approaches
effectively boils down to one of statutory construction and interpretation,
with the resulting normative debate revolving primarily around the relative
desirability of rules versus principles within the enforcement context.51 This
perspective is, on one level, correct. A move toward MPBR would
necessarily entail a shift in terms of statutory construction toward the
articulation of broader principles.52 This shift would, in turn, have
repercussions in terms of both statutory interpretation and enforcement.
However, viewed solely from this narrow, formalist perspective, MPBR
simply forms part of—and risks ultimately being subsumed within—the
traditional (arrested) dialectic.
While the broader theoretical debate has undeniably influenced its
development, MPBR deserves to be decoupled from the traditional dialectic
for two reasons. First, rather than contemplating the wholesale
abandonment of rules, MPBR envisions that rules and principles can play
complementary re-enforcing roles within a regulatory regime (this, in turn,
is the second rationale for characterizing MPBR as simply “more”
principles-based).53 Indeed, MPBR reflects a tacit acknowledgement that
49. A piece of anecdotal evidence illustrating the level of misunderstanding is provided by
Cristie Ford. Ford notes that “87.5% of the 75 written submissions from stakeholders” to Canada’s
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation were in favor of MPBR. Ford, Global Financial Crisis,
supra note 48, at 266. However, as Ford observes: “a substantial number seemed to assume that
principles-based and rules-based regulation were at opposite extremes, and that a move to a more
principles-based system meant substantially eliminating rules no matter how efficient or necessary
they might be.” Id.
50. Black et al., supra note 30, at 191; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note
48, at 6.
51. In particular with respect to the possibility of so-called “regulation by enforcement.” See,
e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 634
(2007); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead
at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 166–67 (1990).
52. See Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 435. See also infra Part II.B.
53. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 4. See Black et al., supra
note 30, at 192; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 266. This vision has been
explained by Julia Black:
There are strong arguments for saying that a tiered approach to rule design should be
adopted—principles need an under-pinning of detailed rules in some areas—and
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the effectiveness of a regulatory regime in delivering desired regulatory
outcomes is a product not just of statutory design, but also institutional
philosophy.54 Second, the theoretical core of MPBR clearly transcends the
engrained formalism of the traditional dialectic. As explored in Part II.A.,
the pith and substance of MPBR is not concerned with the institutional
structure, statutory construction, or even the content of financial
regulation—it is concerned with who generates that regulation and in what
sort of environment they generate it.
A. MPBR IN THEORY: THE CORE PRINCIPLE
The traditional rules versus principles dialectic reflects a legal-centric
view which conceptualizes regulation as emanating exclusively from the
power of the state to generate and enforce “the law.”55 The pervasiveness of
this view is evidenced by the fact that proponents of both rules and
principles share a marked tendency in their arguments to presuppose that
there exist two (and only two) groups of actors, each performing mutually
exclusive functions: one generating, monitoring, and enforcing norms (the
state) and another complying with them (subjects). As depicted in Figure 1,
this top-down, command-and-control paradigm envisions a world in which
communication between regulators and regulated actors is effectively a one
way street.
Figure 1

The State
(Regulator)

Generates, monitors and
enforces regulation.



Subjects
(Regulated Actors)

Comply with state generated regulation.

Standing in stark contrast with the legal-centric paradigm, MPBR is
premised upon an iterative, dialogic relationship within which regulated
detailed rules in turn need the support and coverage of principles to thwart strategies,
which seek to exploit gaps and inconsistencies in those detailed provisions.
Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 429–30.
54. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2003).
55. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–96 (1961); HANS KELSEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST EDITION
OF THE REINE RECHTALEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 99 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson &
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford University Press 1992) (1934).
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actors (and other stakeholders) are invited to play a potentially important
role within the process of generating regulation. MPBR is thus a reflection
of a more expansive (or “decentered”56) understanding of regulation which
spans the public-private divide to encompass all forms of social control or
influence—whether generated, monitored, and enforced via the apparatus of
the state or other sources.57 This dialogic relationship also shares a number
of traits with so-called “new governance” regulatory mechanisms.58 The
basic dynamics of this relationship—examined in greater detail in Part
II.B.—are depicted in Figure 2.

56. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 2–3 (The London Sch. of Econ. and Pol.
Sci. Centre for Analysis of Risk & Reg., Discussion Paper No. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Black,
Critical Reflections].
57. Credit for articulating this more expansive conception is often attributed to the work of
Robert Ellickson regarding “non-legal” dispute resolution mechanisms developed by ranchers and
farmers in Shasta County, California. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). This more expansive conception flows from the
acknowledgement that instrumental public policy objectives are embedded within the design of,
and normative discourses surrounding, these non-state sources of regulation. HUGH COLLINS,
REGULATING CONTRACTS 56–62 (1999).
58. See Black et al., supra note 30, at 193; Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 5; Robert
F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of
the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 838
(2010). The term “new governance” has grown to encompass a wide range of approaches to
administrative governance emphasizing polycentric and collaborative regulatory structures which
span the public-private divide and envision an important role for private (i.e. non-state) actors in
shaping public policy and regulation. Weber, supra at 785. Perhaps most significantly, new
governance mechanisms—much like MPBR—seek to harness the expertise of private actors in
furtherance of public regulatory objectives. Id. at 838. In this respect, both MPBR and new
governance can be understood as pragmatic responses to the increasing complexity within many
fields of human endeavor. Other parallels between MPBR and new governance include: (1) a
dynamic, flexible, and dialogic lawmaking process; (2) the use of flexible forms of legal norms;
and (3) the retention of a strong public role in terms of the generation and, especially, enforcement
of regulation.
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Figure 2

The State
(Regulator)

 Identifies and articulates
outcome-oriented principles.
 Provides guidance respecting the substantive content of
principles.
 Receives and processes
information from regulated
actors with a view to enhancing its information and expertise and updating substantive content.
 Monitors and enforces
compliance with technological and substantive content.




Subjects
(Regulated Actors)

 Generate technological
content in furtherance of
principles (desired regulatory
outcomes).
 Monitor compliance with
technological and substantive
content of principles.
 Share information and
expertise with regulators with
a view to achieving outcomes
and communicating the challenges and business impact
associated with regulation.

It is this dialogic relationship which constitutes the core principle
underlying MPBR. Principles themselves, while an integral element, are
perhaps best understood as uniquely responsive and durable conduits
through which this relationship generates and, importantly, updates
regulation. The label “MPBR” is thus somewhat misleading: a more
accurate (and less tainted) moniker perhaps being “dialogic regulation.”
Such branding issues aside, and before exploring its wisdom and potential
challenges, the next task is to identify the essential elements—the
preconditions—necessary to establish and maintain the dialogic relationship
envisioned by MPBR.
B. MPBR IN PRACTICE: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Taking the archetypal rules-based regime as a point of departure, the
successful implementation of MPBR requires the fulfillment of at least four
preconditions: (1) the identification and articulation by regulators of
outcome-oriented principles; (2) a fundamental change in the philosophy of
both regulators and regulated actors toward their respective roles in
achieving desired regulatory outcomes; (3) the fostering of a new
relationship between regulators and regulated actors premised on real trust,
a more sophisticated dialogue, and shared understandings; and (4) a
credible commitment by regulators to pursue a policy of intensive
supervision combined with targeted and proportional (yet vigorous)
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enforcement. These preconditions together make up the essential elements
of MPBR.
The first element is the identification and articulation by regulators of
legal norms—formulated as regulatory principles—which identify the
regulatory outcomes (or desired behaviors) they are designed to achieve (or
incentivize), and not merely the technical rules and procedures with which
regulated actors are expected to comply.59 This precondition flows from an
acknowledgement (fundamental to MPBR) that regulated actors are often
better positioned than regulators—owing to both their superior expertise
and greater and more timely access to firm-specific and market
information—to determine the technological content of the policies and
procedures necessary to achieve desired regulatory outcomes.60
Simultaneously, regulators are able to redeploy resources away from
prescribing the technological content of regulation toward articulating the
outcomes which regulated actors are expected to deliver, supervising
compliance with these outcomes, and bringing targeted and proportional
enforcement action to compel compliance.61 Ultimately, as Cristie Ford
observes: “[s]ome version of outcome-oriented regulation is a necessary
correlative to principles-based regulation, in that it is a responsible way to
force accountability into a system that leaves the articulation of the content
of those principles to on-the-ground actors.”62
It is important at this juncture to distinguish between substantive and
technological63 content for the purposes of MPBR. The substantive content
of a principle is collectively made up of the animating principle itself (e.g.
“a firm must conduct its business with integrity”), the statutory construction
of any legal norms giving effect to this principle (e.g. anti-fraud
provisions), the interpretive assumptions underpinning this statutory
59. As explained by Dan Waters, the FSA’s principles-based approach involves “a shift of
emphasis . . . away from looking at the processes carried out by firms, toward the outcomes we
seek to achieve, for consumers, firms and markets.” Black et al., supra note 30, at 192 (quoting
Dan Waters, Director of Retail Policy, Financial Services Authority, Speech at the ABI
Conference: Implementing Principles-Based Regulation (Dec. 7, 2006)). A number of observers,
and in some ways the FSA itself, understandably view MPBR and outcome-oriented regulation as
representing distinct (albeit related) approaches to regulation. See, e.g., id. at 191. However, the
symbiotic relationship between these approaches also provides ample justification for the view,
advanced by scholars such as Cristie Ford, that MPBR represents a single and coherent philosophy
of regulation. See Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 14.
60. Black et al., supra note 30, at 192.
61. Id.
62. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 60.
63. In a previous article, I described technological content as “procedural” content. Dan
Awrey, Principles, Prescriptions and Polemics: Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Canadian
Investment Fund Industry, 32 DALHOUSIE L.J. 69, 86 (2009). I have changed the label to reflect
what I think is a helpful distinction drawn by Cary Coglianese and David Lazer between
regulation designed to intervene at the planning (management-based), acting (technology-based),
and output (performance-based) stages. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
691, 693 (2003).
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construction (such as the common law definition of fraud) and, importantly,
the desired regulatory outcomes (e.g. the promotion of confidence in
financial institutions and markets). The technological content of a principle,
on the other hand, consists of the policies and procedures implemented by
regulated actors for the purpose of achieving desired regulatory outcomes.
While responsibility for articulating the substantive content of principles
resides with regulators, MPBR contemplates that the technological content
of principles will in many cases be generated by regulated actors. It further
contemplates that regulators will leverage the information and expertise of
regulated actors when generating and updating substantive content.
The outcome-oriented focus of MPBR envisions a fundamental change
in the philosophy of both regulators and regulated actors64 toward their
respective roles in achieving desired regulatory outcomes.65 There are
several intertwined facets to this change. First, MPBR necessitates that
regulators provide clear and robust guidance respecting the substantive
content of principles.66 Second, to the extent that MPBR contemplates that
the technological content of principles will be generated by regulated
actors, it demands that regulators loosen their grip on the reigns of
regulation and, in so doing, devolve responsibility to—and leverage the
accumulated expertise of—regulated actors in vital areas such as risk
management.67 This in turn requires that a good faith sphere be expressly
carved out in which regulated actors are free to design and implement
technological content with a view to achieving desired regulatory
outcomes.68 Of particular importance in this regard is a philosophy of
transparency, predictability, and restraint in the deployment of enforcement
resources.69 In the absence of such a sphere, regulated actors are more likely
to behave as though subject to prescriptive rules,70 thereby negating many
of the prospective benefits of MPBR described in Part II.C.
The outcome-oriented focus of MPBR concomitantly envisions a
fundamental shift in the role and responsibilities of regulated actors within a
regulatory regime. MPBR requires that regulated actors actively and
meaningfully engage with principles at the highest level with a view to
generating technological content capable of achieving desired regulatory
outcomes. This contemplates both a more hands-on role for boards of
64. Relative to historically predominant rules-based approaches to financial regulation.
65. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.
66. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439. Mechanisms for disseminating such
guidance include, but are not limited to, “official administrative guidance, speeches, ‘no action’ or
‘Dear CEO’ letters, compliance audits, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement
actions.” Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 278.
67. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 27.
68. Black et al., supra note 30, at 200.
69. Id. at 197; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 288–89.
70. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 449; Steven L. Schwarcz, The ‘Principles’
Paradox, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009).
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directors and senior management in terms of their oversight and
stewardship of regulatory compliance matters71 and, simultaneously, a more
strategic business role for firm compliance, risk management, and audit
personnel.72 Importantly, it also contemplates a change in the mindset of
(many) regulated actors. As explained by the FSA in the context of its
migration toward a more principles-based regime:
Firms must change their own behaviour and grasp the opportunities this
presents for increased innovation and more flexible operations, while at
the same time fully appreciating their regulatory responsibilities and
ensuring that they deliver against them.
This will mean a shift in focus from managing a legally driven process of
compliance with detailed rules to managing the delivery of defined
outcomes in a more flexible regulatory environment.

...
Effective compliance will evolve away from a primary focus on the
designing, implementing and monitoring processes that embed detailed
regulatory rules in business operations. Instead, it will increasingly require
the exercise of judgment.73

Accordingly, in addition to a potentially significant shift in the overall
regulatory burden in terms of the generation of technological content,
MPBR thus demands from regulated actors a deeper philosophical change
in terms of their attitude and approach toward their role in achieving desired
regulatory outcomes.
The third essential element of MPBR contemplates a sea change in the
relationship between regulators and regulated actors. This change springs
from the rejection of the prescriptive, command-and-control relationship of
regulated (dis)trust, enforced through an adversarial process, which has
generally characterized financial regulation—both before and in the wake
of the global financial crisis. Residing at its core, as previously discussed, is
a more honest and sophisticated dialogue within which: (1) regulators are
more transparent about their expectations and the regulatory outcomes they
desire to achieve; and (2) regulated actors are more willing to share their
superior information and expertise with a view to achieving regulatory
objectives and more forthcoming about the challenges they face in aligning
their business activities with these objectives.74 The goal of this enhanced
71. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 2; Black et al., supra note
30, at 193.
72. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. See also Black et al.,
supra note 30, at 200.
73. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. See also Black, Forms
and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439.
74. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 8, 17. See also Black, Forms
and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48.
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dialogic relationship is to foster “shared understandings”75 between
regulators and regulated actors regarding their respective roles and
responsibilities within the regulatory regime, the substantive content of
principles, and the real world outcomes regulators hope (and can reasonably
expect) to achieve.76 The cultivation of these shared understandings requires
the creation of a “new regulatory architecture”77 in the form of “interpretive
communit[ies].”78 These interpretive communities—made up of regulators,
regulated actors, and third-party stakeholders (such as industry trade
associations, investor advocacy groups, and the broader policy
community79)—constitute the driving force behind MPBR: generating,
updating, and disseminating substantive and technological content on a
dynamic basis in response to market and regulatory developments.
The forth essential element of MPBR is a credible commitment on the
part of regulators to pursue a policy of intensive supervision and targeted
and proportional (yet vigorous) enforcement. Supervision and enforcement
take on special importance within a more principles-based regime for three
related reasons. First, intensive supervision—that is to say, supervision
characterized both by a high frequency of interactions and high levels of
expertise and independence on the part of supervisors—facilitates greater
information flow between regulators and regulated actors and provides a
built-in feedback mechanism for communicating regulatory expectations in
a non-public, non-adversarial fashion.80 Intensive supervision thus forms
the front line of the enhanced dialogic relationship between regulators and
regulated actors.81 Second, insofar as MPBR contemplates the devolution of
responsibility for generating the technological content of principles to
regulated actors, intensive supervision and the credible threat of
enforcement are necessary in order to ensure the greatest possible

75. Black et al., supra note 30, at 194. As Black et al. explain:
Whether a rule is clear or certain depends on shared understandings. Just looking at a
rule does not tell us whether it is certain. . . . Whether or not a rule is “certain” depends
not so much on whether it is detailed or general, but whether all those applying the rule
(regulator, regulated firm, court/tribunal) agree on what the rule means.
Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 203–04.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 8.
Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 184.
Ayres and Braithwaite have used the term “tripartism” to describe this sort of participation
by third-parties within the regulatory process. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 54–100.
80. See Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 35.
81. Intensive supervision will be particularly vital during the transition toward a more
principles-based regime. See Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 443 (examining the
importance of intensive supervision within the context of the FSA’s role-out of its “Treating
Customers Fairly” (TCF) Initiative).
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congruence between private incentives and public regulatory objectives.82
At the same time, and as described above, MPBR necessitates that
regulators strike a delicate balance between the use of supervision and
enforcement to compel compliance and the desire to foster a more honest
dialogue and stimulate regulatory innovation.83 At the fulcrum of this
balance is a strategy of targeted and proportional enforcement sensitive to
whether any given transgression represents a case of well-intentioned
misjudgment or a more deliberate (or willfully blind) attempt to exploit the
inherent discretion conferred upon regulated actors under MPBR.84
Whereas the former may be addressed within the dialogic relationship itself
without resort to formal enforcement proceedings, the later demands swift
and decisive action on the part of regulators.85 This dovetails with the final
reason why intensive supervision and vigorous enforcement are particularly
important within a more principles-based regime: the need to identify,
punish, and potentially remove from the marketplace altogether (via delicensing) those “bad apples” whose willful misconduct would otherwise
threaten to erode the mutual trust upon which MPBR is premised.
Accordingly, while often overlooked by regulators and other observers
prior to the global financial crisis, intensive supervision and targeted and
proportional enforcement are clearly vital to the success of MPBR.
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the essential
elements of MPBR—where they all coalesce—form something of an
equilibrium. Simultaneously, however, the absence of any one element is
likely to thwart the implementation, or precipitate the systemic unraveling,
of a regulatory regime founded upon MPBR. The experiences of the FSA
are illustrative in this regard: its failure both to foster interpretive
communities (or engage as a meaningful participant within them) and to
pursue a policy of intensive supervision and vigorous enforcement
ultimately undermining its attempts to implement MPBR.86 Indeed,
regulators seeking to harness the prospective benefits of MPBR must
address a myriad of potential challenges.

82. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 19–53. The retention of a strong public role for
supervision and enforcement also serves to distinguish MPBR from various forms of selfregulation. Id. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 58, at 811–12.
83. EXPERT PANEL REPORT, supra note 48, at 20.
84. Id.
85. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 48. To this end, MPBR also requires that a
robust array of remedial mechanisms (including de-licensing) be available in respect to the
violation of principles themselves. Id. The “enforcement pyramid” envisioned by Ayres and
Braithwaite, at the apex of which resides a “benign big gun” (i.e. a regulatory agency with the
power to de-license regulated actors), would seem an appropriate starting point in devising such a
model. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 35–36.
86. See Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 183–84.
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C. THE WISDOM AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF MPBR
If successfully implemented, the wisdom and prospective benefits of
MPBR would potentially flow from four primary sources: (1) the
attenuation of chronic asymmetries of information and expertise between
financial regulators and regulated actors; (2) greater congruence between
the private incentives of regulated actors and public regulatory objectives;
(3) its responsiveness to changing customs, understandings, and new market
developments; and (4) its durability as a source of regulation. Each
manifests important advantages in terms of the regulation of financial
innovation.
Financial regulators face chronic and potentially severe asymmetries of
information and expertise vis-à-vis regulated actors.87 These asymmetries
are products of, inter alia: (1) the high-powered economic incentives
unique to regulated actors to invest in the acquisition of information and
expertise; and (2) incomplete and often less than timely access of regulators
to market and firm-specific information.88 These asymmetries are likely to
be most pronounced on the cutting edge of financial innovation.89 MPBR
holds the potential to attenuate—although perhaps not eliminate—these
asymmetries. As described above, it contemplates that regulated actors will,
as part of the enhanced dialogic relationship, be more willing to share their
superior information and expertise with regulators.90 The interpretive
communities fostered by MPBR—where substantive and technological
content is continuously generated, updated, and disseminated—can
similarly be viewed as conduits for the accumulation of information and
expertise by regulators. Insofar as it can successfully ameliorate these
asymmetries, MPBR manifests clear benefits for regulators: making them
more effective supervisors and enforcers and, importantly, more capable of
playing an active leadership role within interpretive communities. MPBR
also manifests potential benefits for compliance-oriented regulated actors
by helping to overcome the adverse selection (or “lemons”)91 problem
which might otherwise persuade regulators to approach all regulated actors
and activities with (potentially unwarranted) suspicion.
87. Black, Critical Reflections, supra note 56, at 3. See also ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN
CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 126–27 (1999); Dan
Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide, 11
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155, 175–77 (2010) (discussing the regulatory implications of
information asymmetries); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453,
1462 (1997).
88. In many cases, of course, these asymmetries will also be the product of the financial
constraints on regulators.
89. See Awrey, supra note 87, at 175–76 (discussing the challenge of information asymmetry
in the context of increasingly complex financial instruments).
90. Whether regulated actors will actually share this information and expertise is something of
an open question and is, accordingly, explored in greater detail infra.
91. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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The global financial crisis serves as a powerful reminder that the
incentives of private actors will often diverge from the broader public
welfare. Intuitively, one would expect this divergence to be particularly
acute within new and innovative financial markets. Within such markets,
private actors possess powerful incentives to rapidly invest resources with a
view to capitalizing upon temporarily high profit margins. At precisely the
same time, however, regulators are likely to encourage caution and restraint
with a view to identifying the attendant regulatory challenges and crafting
the appropriate policy response.92 MPBR aims to encourage greater
congruence between these private incentives and public regulatory
objectives via several mechanisms.93 First, having been ex ante participants
in the generation of technological content and within various interpretive
communities, MPBR implicitly seeks to engender a higher level of
commitment from regulated actors in terms of ex ante compliance.94
Second, the articulation of outcome-oriented principles acts as a constraint
on the discretion that MPBR confers upon regulated actors with respect to
the design and implementation of technological content, effectively
minimizing the opportunities for welfare-reducing creative compliance and
regulatory arbitrage.95 Finally, MPBR leverages the credible threat of swift
and decisive enforcement action (including de-licensing) in response to the
violation of regulatory principles in order to recalibrate the incentives of
those private actors who might otherwise seek to abuse this discretion.
The third source of prospective benefits flowing from MPBR is its
inherent capacity to respond to changing customs, understandings, and new
market developments. As Cristie Ford explains, the benefits of such
responsiveness are perhaps best understood in juxtaposition to more
prescriptive, rules-based regulatory approaches:
The advantage of regulatory principles, as opposed to detailed rules,
is not that they will remain forever vague, but rather that their content can
be filled in more dynamically and insightfully by those with the greatest
92. Concomitantly, this is also likely to be the point at which the asymmetries of information
and expertise vis-à-vis regulators and regulated actors will be most acute.
93. The advantages of MPBR in terms of the promotion of congruence are particularly clear
when compared with more prescriptive, rules-based approaches to regulation. Prescriptive rules
are by their very nature either over-inclusive or under-inclusive and thus promote or deter the
behavior of regulated actors in ways which are incongruent with their underlying purposes. See
discussion supra Part I.A. Accordingly, as Ford observes: “prescriptive requirements emphasize
the wrong things. That is, they encourage firms to focus on detailed compliance rather than to
exercise sound judgment with a view to the best interests of their clients and the markets.” Ford,
New Governance, supra note 13, at 19.
94. See e.g., Weber, supra note 58, at 847–48. This is the so-called “buy in” argument. See
John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1764 (2007) (in
the context of the work of the U.K. Takeover Panel); Awrey, supra note 87, at 191 (in the context
of OTC derivatives regulation).
95. Black et al., supra note 30, at 195; Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 438.
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understanding of the relevant situations. . . . The difference is that their
content is meant to remain flexible and up to date—that rather than
ossifying, the principles’ content will continue to evolve, discarding older
formulations as newer, more comprehensive or effective ones emerge.96

The responsiveness of MPBR is thus of particular utility (especially
relative to more prescriptive, rules-based approaches)97 within the context
of financial markets, where change and innovation are among the only
constants.98 Importantly, the responsiveness of MPBR—and in particular its
ability to evolve to reflect new market developments without modification
to its substantive core—further minimizes the potential opportunities for
creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, when combined with
its outcome-oriented focus, the responsiveness of MPBR arguably renders it
more or less impervious to evasion.
Finally, the responsiveness of MPBR enhances its durability as a source
of regulation. The generation of prescriptive rules represents a
crystallized—and therefore relatively static—response to the prevailing
conditions within a market, regulatory, and political environment at a
particular moment in time.99 Thereafter incapable of reflecting changing
conditions or new learning, rules “ossify” quickly and, thus, require
constant amendment in order to respond to the rapid pace of change and
innovation that characterizes modern financial markets.100 In sharp contrast,
the responsiveness of MPBR enables it to evolve organically in response to
market developments and new regulatory challenges, often without the need
for formal regulatory intervention.101 Accordingly, as observed by
Lawrence Cunningham, “[i]n rapidly changing environments, such as
securities markets, rules can become obsolete faster than principles.”102
The wisdom of MPBR is perhaps most intuitively understood in terms
of the agency and transaction cost implications of the long-term, iterative
“relational contract”103 formed between regulators and regulated

96. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 36 (emphasis added).
97. Black et al., supra note 30, at 193.
98. Weber, supra note 58, at 812–13. Here we find an obvious and important parallel between
MPBR and new governance. As explained by Weber, “[n]ew governance tools aim to respond to
the continual changes of regulated society and knowledge itself, so ‘all solutions [to problems]
should be seen as provisional.’” Id. at 838 (quoting David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New
Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 539, 542 (2006)).
99. See Black et al., supra note 30, at 193.
100. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 36.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1423 (citing Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and
the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2003)).
103. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 238 (1979) (citing Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
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actors.104 Viewed from this perspective, the benefits of MPBR in terms of
enhancing the expertise and information possessed by regulators, promoting
greater congruence, and responding to uncertain future contingencies can
each be seen as constraining opportunism (agency costs) on the part of
regulated actors.105 At the same time, the responsiveness and durability of
MPBR can be seen as combining to reduce the transaction costs stemming
from the inevitable adaptation of this relational contract in response to
changing customs, understandings, and new developments within financial
markets.106 Notably, this account of the agency and transaction cost
implications of MPBR as a relational contract diverges markedly from the
two-dimensional transaction cost analyses rooted in the traditional dialectic
described above which, as an aside, share many similarities with the
“classical”107 contract model.
All of this is not to suggest, however, that any move toward MPBR
would be somehow “costless.”108 The transition to MPBR would likely
entail a short-term spike in the costs incurred by regulated actors stemming
from the overhaul of technological content to reflect desired regulatory
outcomes. Over the longer term, however, one might expect regulated
actors to realize an “innovation dividend” flowing from, inter alia, the
implementation of bespoke regulatory compliance systems (and the
resulting rationalization of costs) and the extraction of positive network
externalities from their participation within interpretive communities.
Indeed, the realization of such dividends may well be imperative in terms of
garnering a sufficient level of philosophical buy-in from regulated actors.
For regulators, MPBR would likely entail a somewhat more permanent cost
increase relative to more prescriptive, rules-based approaches. This increase
would flow from the need for sustained investment in the infrastructure of
MPBR: the additional supervisory and relationship management personnel,
on-going education programs, and enhanced call center capabilities
necessary to build more dialogic relationships with regulated actors.109

NW. U. L. REV. 854, 885, 890, 901 (1978)). The relational contract in this example would be the
entire body of substantive and technological content generated by regulators and regulated actors
within the context of their long-term, iterative relationship.
104. The reason for this intuitiveness is perhaps that the relationship is essentially a contract
between a licensor (the regulator) and licensee (the regulated actor) wherein the regulator, in
exchange for certain undertakings (e.g. compliance with regulation), grants the regulated actor a
license to engage in business activities within the parameters of their registration.
105. Although, as described in greater detail below, regulated actors are not the only parties in
respect to which agency cost concerns arise within the context of MPBR.
106. Enhancing the expertise and information possessed by regulators may also generate
transaction cost benefits to the extent that, after accounting for acquisition costs, regulators are
able to more cost-effectively identify, understand, and respond to new market developments.
107. See Williamson, supra note 103, at 236–37.
108. In the sense either of being Pareto optimal or manifesting zero transition costs.
109. The FSA, for example, earmarked £50 million to cover non-recurring expenses relating to,
inter alia, reorganization costs, training and development, and improved knowledge management
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Ultimately, however, such investments may provide a useful signal to
regulated actors that regulators are committed to MPBR, thus potentially
helping to overcome the trust paradox described in greater detail below.
Financial regulators seeking to harness the prospective benefits of
MPBR must also address a host of potential challenges. The most
frequently cited of these challenges, perhaps not surprisingly, emanate from
the traditional dialectic: a perceived absence of certainty surrounding
principles resulting in unpredictability in their application.110 Articulated
somewhat differently, the inherent flexibility of MPBR gives rise to the
possibility that regulators and regulated actors will fail to arrive at shared
understandings respecting the scope and/or substantive content of
principles.111 Understandably, regulated actors do not wish to operate within
an environment of regulatory uncertainty—especially where there are
significant costs associated with the risk of “getting it wrong.”112 Within
such an environment, one might expect some regulated actors to adopt more
conservative interpretations of principles as a way of mitigating this risk,
thus generating an unintended “chilling effect.” Julia Black has
characterized this as the “compliance paradox”113 of MPBR. Insofar as it
incentivizes regulated actors to err on the side of caution in this way, the
absence of sufficient certainty and predictability thus runs counter to the
prevailing current of MPBR—stifling regulatory innovation rather than
promoting it.114 At the same time, however, this critique ignores the extent
to which the more honest and sophisticated dialogue and greater mutual
trust between regulators and regulated actors residing at the heart of MPBR
may actually serve to enhance the certainty and predictability surrounding
principles.
The potential absence of sufficient certainty and predictability also
raises the prospect of “regulatory creep.”115 The concept of regulatory creep
proceeds from the premise that regulation—like matter in a gaseous state—
will inevitably expand into any empty space that it encounters. Viewed in
this light, the flexibility of MPBR introduces the possibility that it may be
used (and abused) by regulators to expand the reach of the regulatory hand
into the business activities of regulated actors in a discretionary or arbitrary

in connection with its transition to a more principles-based regime. FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 18.
110. Black et al., supra note 30, at 196.
111. This possibility is arguably rendered more likely by virtue of the proliferation of guidance
(and sources of guidance) within the interpretive communities of MPBR. Id. at 197; Nelson, supra
note 2, at 94.
112. Black et al., supra note 30, at 195.
113. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 449.
114. Carlos Conceicao & Rosalind Gray, Problems of Uncertainty, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 42, 43
(2007).
115. Black et al., supra note 30, at 196.
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fashion.116 A similar risk arises in connection with the technological
guidance generated within interpretive communities, where a concern exists
that industry-developed “recommended,” “good,” or “best” practices will be
invoked by regulators as an “opaque proxy”117 for prescriptive rules. While
the risk of regulatory creep is omnipresent, it is particularly acute in the
context of politically charged environments such as that which has followed
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
The challenges posed by the potential uncertainty and unpredictability
of principles should not be discounted.118 The two most significant
challenges, however, stem not from the nature of principles, but rather the
nature of the relationship which MPBR envisions between regulators and
regulated actors. The first of these challenges is how to build the mutual
trust necessary to sustain truly dialogic relationships. As the FSA has
acknowledged, fostering and maintaining this trust is the “acid test”119 of
MPBR. However, while the new regulatory architecture of MPBR
manifests the potential to generate greater mutual trust, a fairly high
threshold level of trust would instinctively seem necessary at the outset of
the relationship in order to get MPBR off the ground. Black has
characterized this as the “trust paradox.”120 Overcoming the trust paradox
may prove particularly difficult in the current climate, where the global
financial crisis has served to undermine public confidence in the expertise
and incentives of both regulators and regulated actors. In the wake of the
crisis, therefore, it remains an open question whether MPBR can generate
the level of mutual trust necessary to unlock its inherent potential.
The second significant challenge posed by the nature of the enhanced
dialogic relationship is the prospect of regulatory capture. As described
above, MPBR contemplates close contact and collaboration between
regulators and regulated actors within the context of both their supervisory
relationships and as participants within interpretive communities. The
frequency and intensity of these interactions121 places regulated actors in an
advantageous strategic position relative to other stakeholders to influence—
over the long-term and in potentially very subtle and sophisticated ways—
the attitudes of regulators and, accordingly, the substantive content of
regulation.122 The potential for such “soft” capture is exacerbated by the
116. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1433.
117. Mark Wagstaff, Principles Based Regulation: Stability, Risk and Trust 17–18 (Sept. 4,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Wagstaff_Paper.pdf.
118. Although, as previously discussed, the enhanced dialogic relationship and interpretive
communities contemplated by MPBR are specifically designed to address these challenges.
119. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 18.
120. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 456.
121. Along with the likely disparity between the resources possessed by regulators and
regulated actors.
122. For an excellent description of how the U.S. banking industry has succeeded in capturing
both federal banking regulators and the U.S. Congress, primarily by inculcating a pervasive belief
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chronic asymmetries of information and expertise described above.
Minimizing the opportunities for capture, and with it the hollowing out of
substantive regulation by powerful vested interests, is thus of vital
importance to the success of MPBR. Potential strategies for minimizing
such opportunities will be explored in Part III.
It is a testament to the enormity of the foregoing challenges that the
essential elements of MPBR have yet to be implemented in their entirety in
any jurisdiction. Even the standard-bearer of MPBR—the FSA—has failed
thus far to acquire the expertise (or will) necessary to assert itself as an
active participant within interpretive communities and, thus, as an effective
counterweight to regulated actors.123 Perhaps more fundamentally, the
FSA’s adherence to a belief in the self-correcting nature and optimality of
free and unfettered financial markets prior to the crisis124 undermined both
the intensity (and focus125) of its supervision and the vigor with which it
pursued enforcement action. Nevertheless, its inherent promise—combined
with the potential shortcomings of more prescriptive, rules-based
approaches—suggests that it is far too early to write MPBR off. Indeed,
time may well be a critical success factor; time to build mutual trust and
accrete substantive content. Accordingly, and with a view to the future, the
time has come to examine a case study illustrating both the wisdom and
potential challenges of MPBR: the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.
III. MPBR AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: THE REGULATION
OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS
OTC derivatives markets are the 800-pound gorillas of the global
financial system.126 At their most basic level, OTC derivatives are
constructed out of two basic building blocks: options and forwards.127 These
in the benefits of free markets and their importance in securing America’s global position, see
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). See also Weber, supra note 58 (discussing dynamic cooperation
between the public and private sectors in the context of new governance).
123. Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 261.
124. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE
GLOBAL
BANKING
CRISIS
86–88
(2009),
available
at
TO
THE
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
125. Effectively by causing the FSA to shift its focus away from potential systemic risks. Id.
126. As of December 2009, the Bank for International Settlements reported the outstanding
notional value of all OTC derivatives at $615 trillion: several times the global (M3) money
supply. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 25 (June 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/pub/qtrpdf/r_qt1006.pdf. However, while illuminative of the size and growth
of derivatives markets, notional value—effectively the benchmark against which cash flows are
calculated in the context of derivatives transactions—does not provide an accurate picture of value
actually at risk. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that while the gross market value of all
OTC derivatives decreased by 15% between June and December 2009, gross credit exposures fell
by only 6% during the same period. Id.
127. Whereas options represent a contingent right to acquire or dispose of an asset in the future
at a pre-determined price, forwards represent an obligation to do so. See Ed Murray, UK Financial
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building blocks can then be combined in an infinite number of ways (and
with reference to an infinite number of underlying assets), thus giving birth
to the overwhelming diversity and dazzling complexity observed within
modern OTC derivatives markets. From “plain vanilla” currency, interest
rate, and equity-linked swaps, to credit derivatives, complex structured
notes, and other securitizations, the structure and potential uses of OTC
derivatives are theoretically as boundless as the imaginations of the Wall
Street and Canary Wharf “rocket scientists” who create them.128 Put simply,
OTC derivatives markets are hotbeds of financial innovation.
The regulation of OTC derivatives markets represents a compelling
case study for at least two other reasons. First, OTC derivatives played a
prominent role in both the origins and spread of the global financial crisis.
Asset-backed securities and complex collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
resided at the heart of the “originate and distribute”129 lending model which
precipitated the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis. The liquidity crunch
unleashed by the resulting market uncertainty tore through the balance
sheets of many financial institutions, sparking the flight of assets and
collateral calls130 which triggered the near collapse of Bear Stearns,131 the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,132 and the government bailout of AIG
between March and September 2008.133 Second, as amply illustrated by the
crisis, OTC derivatives markets pose a number of significant challenges for
financial regulators.134 Many of these challenges stem from the complexity,
Derivatives Commodities Markets, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND EXCHANGES LAW 265, 267–70
(Michael Blair & George Walker eds., 2007); Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Overthe-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681; Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of
Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 195, 195–96 (1995); Adam R.
Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?,
43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1026–28 (1994). While beyond the scope of this Article, developing a
sufficiently robust definition of derivatives for regulatory purposes has proven problematic.
128. For a more comprehensive overview of the taxonomy of OTC derivatives, see generally
SATYAJIT DAS, THE SWAPS AND FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES LIBRARY (3rd ed. 2006).
129. Rather than continuing to hold debt (un-hedged) on its balance sheet, the originate-anddistribute model contemplates that lenders will repackage debt and distribute it to third party
investors via securitization. Amongst other implications, this has the effect of eliminating the
lenders’ exposure to borrower default and, thus, reduces the incentives of lenders to invest
resources with a view to monitoring creditor quality.
130. Many of which were themselves linked to OTC derivatives.
131. See The $2 Bailout; Investment Banks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 94, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/10881453.
132. See ANTON R. VALUKAS, JENNER & BLOCK LLP, LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS INC.
CHAPTER
11
PROCEEDINGS
EXAMINERS
REPORT
2
(2010),
available
at
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com.
133. For a detailed account of AIG’s derivatives operations, how they precipitated the firm’s
downfall, and the subsequent bailouts, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 943 (2009).
134. These challenges stem from, inter alia: (1) the size of OTC derivatives markets; (2) the
complex inter-connections they create between derivative, underlying, and related markets; and
(3) the opportunities they generate for opportunism, market manipulation, and regulatory
arbitrage.
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opacity, and pace of innovation within OTC derivatives markets and,
accordingly, highlight the chronic asymmetries of information and expertise
which confront financial regulators. The regulation of OTC derivatives
markets thus represents a significant—and socially important—real world
test of the wisdom and prospective benefits of MPBR.
OTC derivatives markets have historically fallen outside the perimeter
of U.S. financial regulation.135 The absence of regulatory intervention was
primarily attributable to a pervasive belief—enshrined in the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)136—in the societal benefits
generated by free markets and their role in securing the United States’
global position.137 In the wake of the global financial crisis, however, the
White House, Congress, and U.S. financial regulators have been spurred to
re-evaluate this non-interventionist stance and determine how best to
respond to the complexity, opacity, and systemic importance of OTC
derivatives markets. The centerpiece of the U.S. response was enacted in
July 2010 as Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.138
A. OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The Obama Administration has characterized the objectives of its new
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets as to: (1) guard
against excessive systemic risk; (2) promote “transparency and efficiency”;
(3) prevent “market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market
abuses”; and (4) block inappropriate marketing to unsophisticated parties.139
The Dodd-Frank Act employs three primary mechanisms in pursuit of these

135. From their inception until the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), OTC derivatives markets enjoyed a de facto
exemption from regulation largely attributable to the jurisdictional posturing of the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and federal
banking regulators. See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivatives
Security Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997) (discussing the multiple regulator status of
financial derivatives and contemplating a shift to a unitary approach). This exemption was
formalized under the CFMA, which exempted OTC derivatives markets from regulatory oversight
by the SEC, CFTC and state regulators.
136. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
137. Indeed, this view pervades the 1999 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets that provided the inspiration for the CFMA. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN.
MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
(1999); see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 122.
138. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1570–80 (2010). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Administration’s
Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final Piece of Legislative Language
Delivered to Capital Hill (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg261.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Press Release] (including the proposed text of the
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009).
139. Treasury Press Release, supra note 138.
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objectives.140 First, the Act confers upon the CFTC and SEC the authority
to require “swaps” and “security-based swaps,”141 respectively, to be
centrally cleared through CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing organizations
or through SEC-regulated securities clearing agencies (CCPs142).143 A
(security-based) swap will be exempt from the central clearing and
exchange trading requirements if one of the counterparties is not a
“financial entity”144 or is using the instrument to “hedge or mitigate

140. However, not included is the so-called “push out” of (most) derivatives activities of
federally insured banks to separate non-bank affiliates. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 716. Also not included is the so-called “Volcker Rule,” which limits
proprietary trading of derivatives by bank holding companies. Id. § 619.
141. Taken together, the definitions of “swap” and “security-based swap” encompass the vast
majority of OTC derivatives instruments. See id. §§ 721, 761. That said, the dividing line between
swaps and security-based swaps is not altogether clear under the Dodd Frank Act, especially with
respect to swaps based on a portfolio of assets, such as those which often form the subject matter
of structured finance transactions.
142. In very broad terms, CCPs interpose themselves as counterparties to what would otherwise
be a number of bilateral transactions, thus assuming counterparty risk and centralizing, inter alia,
clearing and settlement procedures, trading data, and risk management functions. The potential
benefits of CCPs are discussed in greater detail below. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS &
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, CONSIDERATIONS
FOR TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: CONSULTATIVE REPORT 2–3 (2010)
[hereinafter IOSCO TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REPORT].
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763. The process of
determining whether a particular group, category, type or class of (security-based) swap will be
subject to the central clearing and exchange-trading requirements can be initiated by either the
relevant CCP or the relevant regulator. Id. § 723(h)(2)(A). CCPs are required to submit to the
CFTC or SEC, as applicable, “any group, category, type, or class of [security-based] swap” it
intends to accept for clearing and provide notice of this submission to its members. Id.
§ 723(h)(2)(B)(i). In reviewing a submission, the CFTC or SEC will determine whether the
submission is consistent with the core principles of the relevant CCP. Id. § 723 (h)(2)(D)(i). The
relevant regulator is also required to take into account the following factors:
(I) The existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and
adequate pricing data.
(II) The availability of a rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources,
and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent with
the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded.
(III) The effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the
market for such contract and the resources of the [CCP] available to clear the contract.
(IV) The effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to
clearing.
(IV) The existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the
relevant [CCP] or 1 or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property.
Id. § 723(h)(2)(D)(ii).
144. Id. § 723(h)(7)(A)(i). The definition of financial entity includes (security-based) swap
dealers, major (security-based) swap participants, and other categories of financial institution. Id.
§ 723(h)(7)(C).
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commercial risk.”145 The principle advantage of centralized clearing and
settlement is the potential mitigation of counterparty and systemic risk via
the: (1) multilateral netting of exposures;146 (2) collateralization of residual
net exposures;147 (3) enforcement of robust risk management standards;148
and (4) mutualization of losses resulting from clearing member (CM)
failures.149 The centralization of trade data within CCPs and trade
repositories (TRs150) also facilitates greater market transparency and,
accordingly, enables regulators to more effectively monitor systemic risk.151
Second, the Act requires that all (security-based) swaps subject to the
central clearing requirement trade on a regulated board of trade, exchange,
or alternative swap execution facility, thus promoting greater price
transparency and curbing opportunities for market abuse.152 Un-cleared
(security-based) swaps are subject to reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.153 In order to incentivize greater utilization of centrallycleared and exchange-traded instruments, it is likely that the new regime
will ultimately impose higher capital and margin requirements in
connection with un-cleared (security-based) swaps.154

145. Id. § 723(7)(A)(ii). This exemption is subject to a notification requirement. The nonfinancial or hedging counterparty retains the option to require that the instrument be centrally
cleared. Id.
146. Thus decreasing the complexity and resulting opacity of the interconnections within OTC
derivatives markets.
147. Effectively creating a first loss position which serves as a capital buffer in the event of
counterparty default.
148. By, for example, prescribing rules regarding the appropriate design and implementation of
stress tests in respect of the financial models utilized by market participants.
149. See THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MEETING
NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM 97 (2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter IMF REPORT]. At the
same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that CCPs concentrate counterparty, and thus
systemic, risk.
150. A TR is a centralized registry that maintains a database of transaction records. TRs “may
also engage in the management of trade life-cycle events and downstream trade processing
services.” IOSCO TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REPORT, supra note
142, at 1.
151. See IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 105–106.
152. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82, 1762–84 (2010). The execution requirement will not apply
where (1) no board of trade or swap execution facility makes the swap available to trade or (2) one
of the counterparties satisfies the commercial end-user exemption to the central clearing
requirement. Id.
153. Id. §§ 729(a)(1), 766(a)(1). These instruments must be reported to a TR or, where a TR is
unavailable, the relevant regulator. Id.
154. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 138. However, the Act only mandates that the
CFTC, SEC, and federal banking regulators, as applicable, set minimum capital and margin
requirements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act §§ 731(e), 764(e).

302

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the OTC derivatives dealers,155
major swap participants (including banks),156 CCPs,157 TRs,158 and
alternative execution facilities159 (which have over the course of time
developed into the private regulatory infrastructure supporting many OTC
derivatives markets), to register with the SEC, CFTC, and/or federal
banking regulators. Once registered, dealers and major market participants
are subject to, inter alia, capital, margin, reporting and recordkeeping, and
business conduct requirements.160 CCPs registered with the CFTC,
alternative swap execution facilities and TRs, meanwhile, are required to
comply with a set of “core principles” and other requirements articulated in
the Act and to design, implement, monitor, and enforce technical regulation

155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act §§ 731, 764. The term as defined in
the Act means:
[A]ny person who—
(i) holds itself out as a dealer in [security-based] swaps;
(ii) makes a market in [security-based] swaps;
(iii) regularly enters into [security-based] swaps . . . ; or
(iv) engages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the
trade as a dealer or market maker in [security-based] swaps . . . .
Id. § 721(a)(49)(A). The definition does not include a person who does not do so as part of a
regular business. Id. § 721(a)(49)(C).
156. Id. §§ 731, 764. The term as defined in the Act means:
[A]ny person who is not a [security-based] swap dealer and—
(i) maintains a substantial [net] position in [security-based] swaps for any of
the major swap categories as determined by the [relevant regulator],
excluding
(I) positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk;
...
(ii) whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that
could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United
States banking system or financial markets . . . .
Id. §721(a)(33)(A). Or is a financial institution falling under the definition of “financial entity” in
the Act that is highly leveraged, not subject to capital requirements, and maintains a substantial
net position in outstanding (security-based) swaps for any of the major swap categories as
determined by the applicable regulator. Id. The definition of a “substantial position” is left to be
defined by the relevant regulators. Id.
157. Id. § 725.
158. Id. §§ 728, 763.
159. Id. §§ 733, 763. Essentially, OTC derivatives exchanges and other trading platforms.
160. Id. §§ 731, 764. The capital and margin requirements apply only in respect of un-cleared
instruments: these requirements will be set by the relevant CCP in respect of centrally cleared
instruments. Id. Section 737 also contemplates that the relevant regulator may set position limits
(excluding bona fide hedges) for (security-based) swaps that perform or affect a significant price
discovery function with respect to registered entities. Id. § 737.
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in furtherance of these principles.161 While the Act does not articulate a
similar set of core principles for CCPs registered with the SEC, it does
mandate that the agencies adopt consistent and comparable rules governing
these registrants.162
The Dodd-Frank Act carves up jurisdiction over OTC derivatives
markets by distinguishing between contracts for the sale of a commodity for
future delivery and swaps (subject to CFTC jurisdiction), and securitybased swaps (subject to SEC jurisdiction).163 Simultaneously, however, the
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules
and regulations governing functionally or economically similar products
and entities.164 To this end, the SEC and CFTC have been handed joint
responsibility for fleshing out many of the technical details of the Act.165
The Obama Administration also requested that the two agencies produce a
joint plan for harmonizing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.166 At
the same time, innumerable technical issues remain to be resolved.
Arguably the most pressing are those necessary to ensure that CCPs can
adequately discharge their systemic protection function under the new
regime. It is clear that resolving these technical issues will require a high
level of coordination between the SEC, CFTC, federal banking regulators,
and their respective registrants. It is equally clear that many of these issues
reside beyond the traditional competencies of both the SEC and CFTC and,
what is more, manifest potentially significant divergences between the
incentives of private actors and public regulatory objectives. As explored in
greater detail in Part III.B., it is at precisely this point where MPBR can
play a role.
B. CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR MPBR
It is worthwhile acknowledging from the outset that the Dodd-Frank
Act does not explicitly contemplate a role for MPBR. Indeed, beyond a
handful of abstract statements made prior to the global financial crisis,167
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. §§ 725, 728, 733, 763.
Id. § 712(a)(7).
Id. §§ 712, 722, 761–763.
Id. § 712(a)(7).
Id. § 712(d)(1). Including the definitions of “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap dealer,”
“security-based swap dealer,” “major swap participant,” “major security-based swap participant,”
and “eligible contract participant.” Id.
166. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, JOINT
REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/cftcjointreport101609.pdf [hereinafter JOINT REPORT OF THE
SEC AND CFTC].
167. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf; MCKINSEY & CO. & N.Y.C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CORP., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP
(2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report/_final.pdf.
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neither Congress, the Treasury Department, nor U.S. financial regulators
have expressed any appetite for moving toward a more principles-based
regime.168 Furthermore, the failure of the FSA to either predict the coming
crisis or to prevent its occurrence has, in some ways unfairly, reflected
unfavorably on the perceived effectiveness of MPBR.169 Accordingly,
without further inquiry, one might question the desirability of carving out a
role for MPBR within the context of OTC derivatives regulation. The
riposte to this (not unfounded) skepticism is twofold. First, as described
above, the FSA has yet to successfully implement a regime which exhibits
all of the essential elements of MPBR. We will simply never know how
history might have unfolded had the FSA been given more time to achieve
this (admittedly difficult) objective prior to the crisis.170 Second, and more
importantly, the pace of innovation, asymmetries of information and
expertise, and incentive problems which characterize OTC derivatives
markets will invariably render prescriptive, rule-based regulatory regimes
obsolete before the ink dries.171 MPBR manifests the potential to overcome
these challenges and, in the process, generate more responsive, nuanced,
and effective regulation. Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly illustrated
than with respect to the regulation of CCPs under the Act.
The Act rightly identifies CCPs as playing a central role in guarding
against excessive systemic risk and promoting transparency and efficiency
within OTC derivatives markets. In furtherance of this role, CCPs
registered with the CFTC are required to comply with a set of core
principles relating to, amongst other matters, the maintenance of adequate
financial resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management,
settlement procedures, default rules and procedures, rule enforcement,
system safeguards, regulatory reporting, recordkeeping, information
sharing, governance, and conflicts of interest.172 These core principles are
largely derived from a similar set of principles introduced under the CFMA
and applicable to CFTC-registered CCPs, commodities exchanges, and
alternative trading platforms for exchange-traded derivatives.173 As
previously mentioned, the Act contemplates—without providing any
guidance in terms of how to effect this result—that consistent and

168. Other than the CFTC in the view of some observers. However, while the foundation of the
CFTC’s approach toward the regulation of commodities exchanges and contract markets is
founded upon a set of “core principles,” it is contestable whether this approach manifests any of
the other essential elements of MPBR.
169. See, e.g., Conceicao & Gray, supra note 114.
170. It must be remembered that the FSA is itself only 10 years old and that its principles-based
regime is still very much an experiment in progress.
171. Indeed, the U.S. experience in regulating OTC derivatives markets between 1974 and the
global financial crisis provides ample evidence of this. See, e.g., Awrey, supra note 87, at 174–89.
172. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c), Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1687–92 (2010).
173. That is to say, those derivatives, which were traded on exchanges prior to the Act.
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comparable rules will be adopted by the SEC.174 How MPBR can facilitate
such substantive harmonization will be explored in greater detail in due
course.
The Act bestows upon regulated CCPs wide latitude to design and
implement rules and procedures (technological content) in furtherance of
the core principles. This is perhaps not surprising given the myriad
technical issues associated with the centralized clearing and settlement of
OTC derivatives. Table 1 contains a non-exhaustive list of major high-level
technical issues.
Table 1
Major High-Level Technical Issues for CCPs
Product eligibility criteria (i.e. evaluating potential liquidity, susceptibility to manipulation,
etc.)
CM eligibility criteria (i.e. evaluating financial resources, operational capacity and expertise)
Structure of the lines of defense against CM default (i.e. the capital waterfall)
Methodology for calculating initial and variation margin requirements
Methodology for valuing posted collateral/Quality of collateral requirements
Timing and method of variation margin payments
Methodology for calculating CM contributions toward any CCP guarantee fund within the
capital waterfall
Emergency liquidity support/Participation by non-defaulting CMs in the event of CM default (i.e. the portability of positions) and other resolution procedures

Many of these high-level technical issues fall outside the traditional
areas of expertise of financial regulators and/or contemplate timely,
continuous, and detailed access to (and evaluation of) market and
counterparty-specific information.
The methodology for calculating initial and variation margin provides a
relatively straightforward yet representative example. CCPs seek to
minimize their residual net exposures (i.e. after multilateral netting) by
requiring counterparties to post collateral175 at the outset of an OTC
derivatives contract (initial margin).176 Thereafter, CCPs periodically177
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 712(d)(2)(D),
763(n)(4)(C).
175. Typically either cash or highly liquid securities.
176. IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 4.
177. Typically each day. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, GUIDANCE ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE 2004 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES
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adjust the amount of posted collateral required to keep the contract open in
order to reflect market fluctuations (variation margin).178 The purpose of
initial and variation margin is to reduce the exposure of CCPs to
counterparty and market risk and, thereby, ameliorate the systemic risks
arising from their potential failure.179 The relevant core principle under the
Act states as follows:
(D) Risk Management.—
...
(iii) LIMITATION

OF EXPOSURE TO POTENTIAL LOSSES FROM

DEFAULTS.—Each

derivatives clearing organization, through
margin requirements and other risk control mechanisms, shall
limit the exposure of the derivatives clearing organization to
potential losses from defaults by members and participants of the
derivatives clearing organization to ensure that—
(I) the operations of the derivatives clearing organization
would not be disrupted; and
(II) nondefaulting members or participants would not be
exposed to losses that nondefaulting members or participants
cannot anticipate or control.
(iv) MARGIN REQUIREMENTS.—The margin required from each
member and participant of a derivatives clearing organization
shall be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal market
conditions.
(v) REQUIREMENTS REGARDING MODELS AND PARAMETERS.—
Each model and parameter used in setting margin requirements
under clause (iv) shall be—
(I) risk-based; and
(II) reviewed on a regular basis.180

The relative simplicity of the principle, however, belies the true
complexity of its requirements. Calculating initial and variation margins
requires sophisticated financial models incorporating, amongst other
variables, historic price volatility, market volatility, and any idiosyncratic
characteristics of the relevant instrument (for example, the non-linear price
characteristics and “jump to default” risk181 associated with single-name
TO OTC DERIVATIVES
REPORT].

CCPS 4 (2010) [hereinafter IOSCO RECOMMENDATION FOR CCPs

178. Id.
179. See id.; IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 7.
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c)(2)(D), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1688–89 (2010).
181. To say that a credit default swap exhibits non-linear price characteristics is essentially to
say that any change in the underlying market conditions or asset prices may be disproportional to

2011]

Regulating Financial Innovation

307

credit default swaps).182 Calculating margin also requires CCPs to
continually monitor counterparty positions with a view to assessing their
scale, concentration, and risk profile.183 These calculations become even
more complex where CCPs engage in “portfolio margining” across all of a
counterparty’s open positions.184 The financial models used by CCPs
require rigorous and ongoing back-testing and stress-testing in order to
evaluate their robustness during periods of market distress.185 What is more,
these models must be recalibrated to reflect relevant market developments
such as evolving relationships between financial markets and, importantly,
the introduction of new and innovative financial instruments.186 All of these
processes demand subjective judgments by personnel with technical
expertise and experience in, amongst other areas, stochastic modeling.187
The majority of financial regulators are quite simply out of their depth
when it comes to these and other similar technical issues.188
The relative dearth of expertise possessed by regulators with respect to
many of the technical issues associated with the centralized clearing and
settlement of OTC derivatives does not bode well in terms of the ability of
the either the SEC or CFTC to monitor compliance with the Act. This
dearth becomes even more foreboding when one realizes that these
technical issues: (1) are central to achieving the policy objectives
underlying the Act; and (2) manifest latent incentive problems. Table 2 sets
out the same non-exhaustive list of major high-level technical issues, this
time alongside their attendant public policy objectives and latent incentive
problems.

the resulting impact on the value of the swap. Jump-to-default risk, meanwhile, is the risk that the
reference credit will go from non-default to default so rapidly that the market will not have an
opportunity to incorporate the increased default risk associated with its movement towards default
into the swap’s current credit spread.
182. See IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177, at 14.
183. See id.
184. Where, as a result, the correlations between various financial instruments and markets
become particularly important.
185. IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177, at 14–15.
186. See id. at 4–5, 14.
187. And, ideally, an appreciation for the limits of stochastic models (which are premised on
randomness) within increasingly interconnected global financial markets.
188. See Waldman, supra note 127, at 1080. This is not to suggest, of course, that all regulators
were created equal in this regard: the CFTC for example has developed some potentially
transferrable expertise with respect to centralized clearing and settlement of exchange-traded
derivatives. Also, the CPSS-IOSCO joint working group has exhibited a firm grasp of the
complexity of many of these technical issues, if not necessarily how they should be resolved. See
IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177.
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Table 2
Major High-Level Technical Issues for CCPs,
Attendant Public Policy Objectives, and Latent Incentive Problems
Technical Issue
Product eligibility
criteria (i.e. evaluating potential liquidity,
susceptibility to manipulation, etc.)

CM eligibility criteria
(i.e. evaluating financial resources, operational capacity and
expertise)
Structure of the lines
of defense against
CM default (i.e. the
capital waterfall)

Methodology for
calculating initial and
variation margin requirements

Public Policy
Objectives
Ensuring that the broadest possible range of products is subject
to the centralized clearing and
exchange-trading requirements
arguably furthers all of the
190
stated objectives of the Act

Ensuring that CMs possess
sufficient financial resources,
operational capacity and expertise minimizes the likelihood of
CM default (thereby furthering
the systemic protection objective of the Act)
Ensuring that CCPs possess
adequate financial resources to
withstand periods of market
distress and CM defaults minimizes the likelihood of CCP
failure; appropriate mechanisms
for mutualizing losses amongst
CMs minimize moral hazard
(thereby furthering the systemic
protection objective of the Act)

Employing a prudent methodology for calculating margin requirements minimizes the residual exposure of CCPs to counterparty and market risk (thereby furthering the systemic protection objective of the Act)

Latent Incentive
189
Problems
CCPs may be compelled by
competitive pressures (or to
extract network externalities
or economies of scale) to expand the universe of eligible
products, even where they
exhibit little or no economic
value or manifest potential
systemic risks
CCPs may be compelled by
competitive pressures to adopt
less stringent eligibility criteria, even where doing so increases the likelihood of CM
default
CCPs may be compelled by
competitive pressures to structure lines of defense to the
benefit of counterparties (by,
for example, imposing lower
margin requirements or accepting lower quality collateral) or CMs (by, for example,
not requiring them to contribute toward a CCP guarantee
fund), even where doing so
undermines their ability to
withstand periods of market
distress or CM defaults
CCPs may be compelled by
competitive pressures to employ methodologies which
systematically under-estimate
prudent margin requirements

189. Many of these latent incentive problems rely at least in part on assumptions respecting: (1)
the existence of a competitive market for CCPs and/or low price elasticities of demand as between
cleared and un-cleared instruments; and/or (2) the preference of decision-makers for current
(enhanced revenues) over potential future (losses stemming from the realization of systemic or
other risks) consumption.
190. Although it is contestable whether casting such a broad net will actually enhance
efficiency. Furthermore, to the extent that imposing centralized clearing requirements on the
broadest possible range of instruments serves to concentrate counterparty and operational risk
within CCPs, it may actually exacerbate systemic risk.
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What becomes immediately apparent on the face of Table 2 is that
CCPs are likely to face significant competitive and other pressures
incentivizing them to generate technological content which may be
incongruent with the policy objectives underlying the Act.
Returning to our margin example, it can be expected that the
opportunity costs of posting collateral will drive counterparties and CMs to
clear trades through the CCPs which impose the least onerous initial and
variation margin requirements.191 Indeed, so great are the perceived
opportunity costs that large commercial counterparties have expended
considerable financial and political capital lobbying lawmakers in both the
U.S192 and E.U.193 for exemptions from these requirements on the basis that
they make it too costly for businesses to use derivatives to manage risk.194
In the U.S., these efforts have yielded exemptions from the central clearing
and exchange trading requirements for commercial end-users using
(security-based) swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.195 These
efforts also induced Senators Chris Dodd and Blanche Lincoln,196 in
response to industry concerns that the Act was ambiguous in this regard, to
send a letter to Representatives Barney Frank and Colin Peterson197
confirming that the margin and capital requirements imposed on (securitybased) swap dealers and major (security-based) swap participants in
connection with un-cleared instruments were not to be imposed on

191. Reform of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Limitless Risk and Ensuring Fairness
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 185 (2009) (statement of René M. Stulz, Everett
D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Econ., Ohio State Univ.); IMF REPORT, supra note 149,
at 26.
192. See, e.g., Hal Weitzman, Exemption Sought to OTC Derivatives Rules, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 12, 2010, at 4 (discussing the efforts of the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users).
See also Damian Paletta, Democrats Deny Buffett on a Key Provision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010,
at A4.
193. See, e.g., Consultation Document: Possible Initiatives to Enhance the Resilience of OTC
Derivatives Markets, COM (2009) 332 final (July 3, 2009).
194. Most often interest rate and foreign exchange risk.
195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(h)(7), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1679 (2010).
196. Respectively, the former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs and former Chairwoman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry. History of the Chairmen of the Senate Banking Committee. U.S. S. COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_files/Chairmenof
theSenateBankingCommittee.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); Blanche Lincoln Biography, U.S. S.
COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION & FORESTRY, http://www.ag.senate.gov/site/lincolnbio.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2011).
197. Respectively, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Financial Services and
House Committee on Agriculture. Who We Are: the Full Committee, H.R. COMM. ON FIN.
SERVS., http://www.financialservices.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=397 (last visited Mar.
COMM.
ON
AGRIC.–DEMOCRATS,
2,
2011);
Committee
Members,
H.R.
http://democrates.agriculture.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=34&LSBID=23|69
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2011).
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commercial end-users.198 While potentially warranted, these carve-outs cut
against the grain of the systemic protection objective of the Act. At the
same time, however, the prospect of financial regulators imposing brightline margin requirements across the board would also appear to be suboptimal insofar as these requirements would not reflect market,
counterparty or product-specific risk factors.
By now the broad strokes of a potential role for MPBR should be
starting to take shape. On the assumption that it can be successfully
implemented,199 the mutual trust, enhanced dialogic relationships, and
interpretive communities thereby generated could be leveraged to tap the
accumulated information and expertise of CCPs, CMs, and major
counterparties, thereby attenuating the twin asymmetries which confront
financial regulators. This transfer of information and expertise could then
be brought to bear on more intensive supervision of CCPs and other market
participants. More expert regulators possessed of more timely, accurate, and
complete market- and firm-specific information would also serve to make
the threat of swift and decisive enforcement more credible. As previously
described, more intensive supervision and the credible threat of
enforcement would ultimately serve to better align the incentives of private
actors with the policy objectives underlying the Act, thus providing some
measure of protection from, for example, the hollowing out of its systemic
protection mandate due to competitive pressures on CCPs.
Enhancing the information and expertise possessed by regulators would
also enable them to play a more meaningful leadership role within
interpretive communities. Indeed, the new regulatory architecture
envisioned by MPBR may prove particularly well suited to the task of
fleshing out the innumerable (and often highly complex) outstanding
technical issues under the Act which have been relegated to the postenactment rulemaking process.200 By way of example, the accumulated
expertise within interpretive communities could be leveraged to help
generate substantive and technological content surrounding such key
concepts as: (1) the requirement that CCPs maintain financial resources
sufficient to meet their obligations to CMs and counterparties in “extreme
but plausible market conditions;”201 (2) the quantitative and qualitative
elements of a “substantial position” for the purpose of determining whether
a market participant constitutes a major (security-based) swap

198. See Damian Paletta, Late Change Sparks Outcry Over Finance-Overhaul Bill, WALL ST.
J., July 2, 2010, at A4.
199. The reasonableness of this assumption is examined in greater detail infra.
200. The law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell has estimated that the Act contemplates the creation
of 243 new formal rules. Editorial, The Uncertainty Principle, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2010, at A18
[hereinafter The Uncertainty Principle].
201. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c)(2)(B)–(C), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010).
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participant;202 and (3) the definition of “hedging” and, thus, the scope of the
commercial end-user exemptions from central clearing and exchange
trading requirements.203 Interpretive communities could also help channel
industry expertise with a view to fleshing out the anemic criteria which
regulators must take into account when determining whether a (securitybased) swap should be subject to the central clearing and exchange trading
requirements. More broadly, interpretive communities comprised of
regulators, regulated actors, and other stakeholders could provide a solid
foundation from which to address the “trillion unintended consequences”204
which many observers believe reside within the Act’s 848 pages.205
Another prospective benefit of carving out a role for MPBR stems from
its capacity to facilitate substantive harmonization. As described above, the
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules
governing, inter alia, CCPs. This requirement exists notwithstanding vast
differences between the statutory frameworks (and institutional cultures) of
the two, often feuding, agencies. Perhaps most significantly, whereas the
SEC’s statutory framework under the Securities Act of 1933206 and
Exchange Act of 1934207 is predominantly rules-based, the CFTC’s
approach toward the regulation of CCPs, commodity exchanges, and
alternative trading platforms is (as we have already seen) founded upon a
set of broad principles. MPBR holds the potential to bridge this formal
divide by focusing instead on the articulation and subsequent realization of
desired regulatory outcomes.208 For the same reason, MPBR can also
facilitate substantive harmonization between the U.S. and other emerging
national (and supranational209) regulatory regimes governing OTC
derivatives markets. Indeed, enhanced international coordination amongst
financial regulators with a view to monitoring systemic risks and ensuring
substantive harmonization is a strategic necessity given: (1) the globalized
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. § 721(a)(33).
Id. § 723(h)(7).
See A Trillion Unintended Consequences, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at A16.
A number commentators have described the Act as running to approximately 2,300 pages.
See The Uncertainty Principle, supra note 200. However, the version of the Act on file with the
Library of Congress only runs to 848 pages.
206. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2006)).
207. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78nn (2006)).
208. And, furthermore, by emphasizing the importance of dialogue.
209. Such as, for example, that which is starting to emerge from the E.U. See European
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Commission Communication, Ensuring
Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets, COM (2009) 332 final (July 3, 2009) [hereinafter
EC Working Paper]; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK & COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES
REGULATORS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (May 2009)
[hereinafter CESR RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/data/document/
09_627.pdf.
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nature of OTC derivatives markets; (2) competitive pressures to establish
cross-border links between CCPs and trading platforms;210 and (3) the
existence of markedly different systems governing, amongst other areas,
bankruptcy,
property,211
and
contract212
law
across
jurisdictions.213 Most importantly, however, substantive harmonization at
both the domestic and international level is essential in order to minimize
the corrosive systemic effects of regulatory arbitrage. Insofar as its
outcome-oriented focus is able to promote greater harmonization, MPBR is
thus very likely to have a positive impact in terms of the overall
effectiveness of OTC derivatives regulation.
All of this is not to suggest that the wisdom and prospective benefits of
MPBR will be revealed and accrue predominantly at the early, formative
stages of global OTC derivatives regulation. It is all but certain that the
forces of change and innovation will continue to shape financial markets.
New financial instruments and institutions will be created, new methods for
measuring and managing various risks will be developed, relationships
between financial markets will continue to evolve. Many of these
developments will raise novel and complex issues. As these developments
unfold, the hallmarks of MPBR—greater expertise, enhanced dialogic
relationships, and interpretive communities—will enable regulators to
mount more timely, nuanced, and effective responses to their attendant
regulatory challenges. Simultaneously, the responsiveness of MPBR,
buttressed by the durability of its outcome-oriented substantive core, will
serve to deter socially useless forms of innovation motivated by, perhaps
most glaringly, regulatory arbitrage. The responsiveness and durability of
MPBR are thus very much geared toward generating benefits over the long
term.
The prospective benefits described above combine to make a persuasive
case for carving out a role for MPBR within the context of OTC derivatives
regulation. But what about the potential challenges? As a preliminary
matter, it is worth observing that the durability of MPBR—along with its
210. See IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 20–21, 23.
211. For example, legal rules impacting both the possibility and feasibility of segregating
counterparty and CM assets (i.e. cash and securities posted as collateral) within a CCP vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN ET AL., REPORT TO THE SUPERVISORS OF
THE MAJOR OTC DERIVATIVES DEALERS ON PROPOSALS OF CENTRALIZED CDS CLEARING
SOLUTIONS FOR THE SEGREGATION AND PORTABILITY OF CUSTOMER CDS POSITIONS AND
RELATED MARGIN 5–22 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
Full_Report.pdf.
212. For example, the contractual concept of novation is the most common method by which
CMs assign derivatives transactions to CCPs. However, this concept is not a universal feature of
contract law and, thus, the legal method by which CCPs interpose themselves into a transaction
may vary across jurisdictions.
213. EC Working Paper, supra note 209; CESR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 209, at 92,
150–52; IOSCO RECOMMENDATION FOR CCPS REPORT, supra note 177, at 9, 26; IMF REPORT,
supra note 149.
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capacity to enhance the certainty and predictability surrounding key
concepts—confound the predictions of the traditional dialectic in terms of
the challenges flowing from the utilization of principles. The real
challenges associated with the implementation of MPBR arise instead from
the nature of the relationship it envisions between regulators and regulated
actors and, more specifically, the dual (and in some ways conflicting)
imperatives of building mutual trust whilst at the same time minimizing the
potential for regulatory capture.
The iterative, dialogic relationship between regulator and regulated
actors which characterizes MPBR raises the specter of capture and, with it,
the eventual dilution of the systemic and other protections potentially
afforded by the Act. The challenge of minimizing the potential for capture
would need to be approached from several angles. First, the SEC and
CFTC214 would require the legal authority, remedial powers, and resources
necessary to undertake intensive supervision and maintain a strong
(background) enforcement presence.215 In terms of the regulation of CCPs,
this would mean providing regulators with, inter alia: (1) a wide range of
enforcement powers available in connection with the violation of core
principles by CCPs, CMs, and counterparties;216 and (2) broad “emergency”
powers enabling regulatory intervention during periods of market distress.
Second, the governance structure of CCPs would need to be structured so as
to establish clear lines of communication with, and accountability to, the
relevant regulator(s). Accompanying these structures would ideally be
mechanisms designed to render transparent the decision-making processes
of CCPs in terms of the generation of technological content—particularly
with respect to their risk management practices.217 Third, regulators would
have to make a concerted effort to identify and attract appropriate third
party stakeholders into interpretive communities.218 To the extent that the
interests of these stakeholders are sufficiently diverse, their views could
serve to filter out potential distortions in the perspectives advanced by more
vested interests. Finally, and along the same vein, regulators would need to
214. And, as applicable, federal banking regulators.
215. The CFTC, for example, has recently acknowledged that it lacks sufficient authority: (1) to
ensure that exchanges and CCPs it regulates “are operating within the principles, rules and
regulations established under” its enabling legislation; (2) to “adapt to market conditions and
international standards”; (3) to “protect the public”; and (4) over disruptive trading practices.
JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND CFTC, supra note 166, at 11–13.
216. By implication, this would necessitate: (1) the extension of core principles for CFTCregistered CCPs to SEC registered CCPs; and (2) the development of a set of core principles for
both CMs and counterparties.
217. By, for example, requiring CCPs to publicly disclose their methodologies (including their
underlying assumptions) for calculating initial and variation margin requirements, along with the
reasons why they believe their methodologies are aligned with the objectives of the Act.
218. With respect to the regulation of CCPs, such stakeholders might include policy analysts
and scholars in the fields of economics, finance, and law. In other areas, investor advocacy groups
might also play a meaningful role.
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leverage their new found expertise with a view to developing their own
“political economy filters.”219 Collectively, these strategies can minimize—
though perhaps not foreclose—the possibility of capture.
The second challenge is how to build the mutual trust necessary to
foster the enhanced dialogic relationships and interpretive communities
from which the prospective benefits of MPBR largely flow. This challenge
looms large in the wake of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the
regulation of CCPs under the Act arguably provides a unique window of
opportunity to overcome this trust paradox for three reasons. First, the
CFTC has already acquired potentially transferrable experience forging
relationships with regulated actors on the basis of a regulatory framework
founded upon broad principles.220 Second, the fact that CCPs are essentially
a new species of regulated actor might allow all parties concerned to enter
the relationship with a relatively clean slate. That CCPs were considered by
most observers to have performed well during the crisis would no doubt
prove helpful in this respect.221 Third, carving out a role within the
relatively circumscribed context of the regulation of CCPs would enable
regulators to employ incrementalism as a means of establishing a credible
commitment to MPBR.222 The objective in this regard would be to create a
virtuous circle whereby establishing a credible commitment would enhance
mutual trust, thereby generating the benefits described above and,
ultimately, facilitating an expansion of the potential role for MPBR.
Simultaneously, incrementalism interposes a natural circuit breaker: where
the prospective benefits of MPBR fail to materialize (or its challenges are
deemed too great) it serves to contain the sunk and transition costs of, in
effect, unwinding the experiment.
IV. MPBR AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: BROADER
APPLICATIONS
In theory, the prospective benefits of MPBR—especially in terms of its
responsiveness and durability—most strongly resonate within environments
exhibiting high rates of change and innovation. Looking across the entire
panoply of institutions, instruments, and activities within global financial
markets, this suggests that MPBR is likely to generate the greatest benefits
219. The effectiveness of this filter could be enhanced by: (1) enforcing a rotation policy for
regulatory personnel working on particular technical issues or supervising particular CCPs; and
(2) limiting the ability of supervisory personnel, subsequent to their departure from the regulator,
to accept employment (or other benefits) from regulated actors which they had previously
supervised.
220. The SEC would, to a certain extent, have to play catch-up in this regard.
221. See, e.g., EC Working Paper, supra note 209, at § 2.4.2.1; IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at
2.
222. For a more complete description of the rationale underlying this strategy, see AVINASH K.
DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN
BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 157–58 (1991).
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in the area of financial product regulation. At the same time, as illustrated
by the CCP example, the capacity of MPBR to ameliorate asymmetries of
information and expertise and realign the incentives of private actors opens
the door to a potentially broader role in connection with conduct of business
and prudential regulation. Ultimately, however, the broader applications of
MPBR must be determined on the basis of their relative costs: the
transaction costs of regulation, the agency cost implications for both
regulators and regulated actors, and the social costs of (in)effective
financial regulation. It is noteworthy in this regard that the enhanced
dialogic relationships and interpretive communities of MPBR can be
leveraged to yield more robust cost-benefit analyses. Furthermore, it bears
reminding that MPBR does not preclude the utilization of regulatory tools
formulated on the basis of prescriptive rules. Indeed, this may be the
ultimate wisdom of MPBR: that it neither preordains nor envisions as static
the optimal solutions to the myriad potential challenges associated with the
regulation of complex and evolving global financial markets.
CONCLUSION
Modern financial markets are characterized by complexity, seemingly
perpetual innovation, chronic asymmetries of information and expertise,
and pervasive agency costs. Perhaps nowhere are these characteristics—or
their attendant regulatory challenges—more pronounced than within OTC
derivatives markets. Mounting effective responses to these challenges must
be considered amongst the most difficult and important tasks confronting
financial regulators. Prescriptive, rules-based approaches toward financial
regulation have thus far proven inadequate to this task. Through the
utilization of outcome-oriented principles, enhanced dialogic relationships,
intensive supervision, and targeted and proportional (yet vigorous)
enforcement, MPBR manifests the potential to overcome these challenges
and, in the process, generate more nuanced, responsive, durable, and
effective regulation. It remains an open question, however, whether MPBR
can successfully conquer its own challenges in terms of how to insulate
itself from regulatory capture and build mutual trust between regulators and
regulated actors. Nevertheless, if these challenges can be bested, carving
out a role for MPBR may well prove the optimal prescription for regulating
financial innovation and, perhaps, beyond.

